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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 940610-CA

RANDALL PUGMIRE,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1994) . This Court has jurisdiction over
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Is the

contained

statutory

in Utah

definition

Code Ann.

of

"dangerous weapon"

§ 76-10-501 (2) (c)

(Supp. 1994)

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case?
A reviewing court examines "the trial court's decision on the
constitutionality of

[a] statute for correctness, according no

deference to its legal conclusions."
454, 465

State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948

(Utah 1993)

(citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that a Buck knife

is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-503, which prohibits possession of a dangerous weapon by a

restricted person?
The

trial

instrument
question.

court's

constitutes

determination
a

"dangerous

of

whether

weapon"

a

particular

presents

a

legal

Nonetheless, in reviewing that question, the appellate

court should grant the trial court a considerable

"measure of

discretion" because the trial court, which saw, felt, and examined
the knife, was in a better position to make the determination.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 76-10-501 (2) (c)

(Supp.

1994),

defining

certain terms related to weapons, provides:
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in
the manner of its use or intended use is
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. The following factors shall be used
in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument,
object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced,
if any; and
(iii) the manner in which the instrument,
object, or thing was used.
Utah
category

Code

Ann.

§

76-10-503(2)

of persons not permitted

(Supp.
to have

1994),

defining

dangerous weapons,

provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who is on parole or probation
for a felony may not have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is
guilty of a third degree felony. . . .

2

a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of
driving under the influence, open container, driving on suspension,
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 12).

Defendant was bound over on all but the charge of driving on

suspension (R. 15-16).

After a bench trial, the court dismissed

the DUI charge and convicted defendant on the weapons charge, a
third degree felony, and the open container violation, a class C
misdemeanor (R. 39-42, 45-48) . Defendant was sentenced to 90 days
in jail on the misdemeanor and zero to five years in prison on the
weapons charge, to run concurrently. Execution of the sentence was
suspended in favor of three years on probation, 120 days in jail
with work

and

therapy

release, aftercare

associated

with a

substance abuse program, and various fines and fees (R. 51-52) .
Defendant subsequently filed an application for certificate of
probable cause, which the trial court granted (R. 66). Defendant
then filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 70).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Jerry Knight, who had recently moved in with defendant's exwife, Rexine Esplin, awoke on February 8, 1994 to find that his car
antenna had been broken and his tires had been slashed, both for
the second time (Tr. I).1

That evening, Knight went to Rexine's

home, where she was experiencing a series of harassing telephone
calls. Rexine had previously notified the police about such phone
calls and also had a protective order entered against defendant (R.
i

"Tr." refers to the trial transcript of May 23, 1994.
3

14, 39). "Tense and nervous," Knight left the residence, driving
toward a nearby 7-11 store (Tr. 8) .

Within blocks, Knight saw

defendant sitting in his vehicle with the engine running.

Knight

called Rexine on a car phone to tell her of defendant's whereabouts
so that she could alert the police.

According to Knight, when

defendant got out of his vehicle and walked toward him, he
staggered and appeared to be intoxicated (Tr. 8-9).
Defendant then followed Knight in his car for a while.
Subsequently,

Knight

Rexine's residence.

somehow

lost

defendant

and

returned

to

Shortly thereafter, defendant showed up, and

Knight let him in (Tr. 13). As soon as Rexine realized defendant
was in the home, she headed for the telephone to call 911 (Tr. 14) .
Walking quickly, defendant approached Rexine.

Knight grabbed him

from behind and wrestled him to the ground.

The police arrived

moments later, and defendant was arrested (Tr. 14-15, 60) .
After the arrest, a police officer searched defendant and
found a Buck knife with a four-inch blade in his pocket (Tr. 44).
The officer who testified at trial stated that the knife was
"definitely" larger than a normal pocket knife (Tr. 44).
Towards the end of trial, after some discussion between both
counsel and the court about the nature of the knife, the court
stated: "I would like to see the knife. You have described it and
why don't I see it? . . . That is more informative to me than
having someone describe it" (Tr. 84).
After the knife was produced, the trial court made the
following written ruling:
4

The knife itself, in this court's view, is not
what one would consider an ordinary pocket
knife. The knife is very large and very heavy
to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife
that would ordinarily be carried in a
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110.
It consists of a large and mostly metal handle
being four and seven-eighths inches in length
and ranges in width from one and one-eighth
inches on one end of the handle to seveneighths inches on the blade end of the handle.
The actual blade of the knife is a large
heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches
wide at its widest point tapering to a point
on the end of the blade. The blade is well
sharpened and the total length of the blade is
four and one-half inches and the blade
extending from the knife when opened is three
and three-quarters inches to four inches,
depending on the measurement from the rounded
handle to the tip of the blade. The court is
of the opinion that this is the type of knife
ordinarily used by game hunters for the
purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning,
skinning or dismembering game animals. The
blade of the knife is in a locked position
when fully opened.
The court concludes that this knife is not an
ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use
of the knife is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury and is a dangerous
weapon under the provisions of UCA 76-10501(2) (a) .
(R. 39-40).
reasonable

The court then found defendant guilty beyond a
doubt

of

possession

of

a

dangerous

weapon

by a

restricted person (R. 39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

statutory

definition

of

"dangerous

weapon"

is

not

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. In
pertinent part, the definition states that "any item that in the
manner of its . . . intended use is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury" is a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §765

10-501(2) (c) (Supp. 1994).

The Court has previously construed

"intended use" to include the item's objectively intended use.
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App. 1991) . Plainly,
a knife whose primary purpose is to skin animals, cut through
flesh, and dismember game is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury and is, therefore, a dangerous weapon as a matter of
law.

Plainly, the statutory definition was sufficiently definite

to put defendant on notice that his possession of a Buck knife was
unlawful.
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court's determination that his Buck knife was a
dangerous weapon.

Defendant, however, has failed to marshal the

evidence in support of the trial court's ruling.

This Court,

therefore, should not consider his claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TERM "DANGEROUS WEAPON," DEFINED
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-501 (2) (c) ,
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS
APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
BECAUSE IT PLAINLY EMBODIES ITEMS
THAT ARE OBJECTIVELY INTENDED TO BE
CAPABLE OF CAUSING DEATH OR SERIOUS
BODILY INJURY
Defendant asserts that the statutory definition of "dangerous
weapon"

is

unconstitutionally

vague

because

it

provides

insufficient guidance for determining what does and does not fall
within the ambit of the law.

Because legislative enactments are

endowed with a strong presumption of constitutionality, the burden
is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to
6

establish its invalidity.

State ex rel. Division of Consumer

Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) .
A reviewing court will not declare statutes unconstitutional
"unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they can be
construed as conforming to constitutional requirements."

In re

Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988).
The void-for-vagueness doctrine on which defendant relies
requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with
"sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations omitted).

Impossible standards of

clarity are not required. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, in
rejecting a vagueness challenge to a statute that prohibited
driving at a "speed greater than is reasonable and prudent" under
existing conditions, "[t]he statute need only be as definite and
certain as the subject matter permits." State v. Pilcher. 636 P.2d
470, 471 (Utah 1981).
As applied to his case, defendant believes that three factors
-- "the relatively small size of the knife in question, the
numerous legitimate uses of such a knife, and the lack of any prior
warning to the Defendant" -- preclude characterization of his knife
as a dangerous weapon and demonstrate the constitutional infirmity
of the statutory definition.

See Br. of App. at 17.

For his

argument, defendant relies primarily -- and mistakenly --on State
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991).
7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (c) defines the term as follows:
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in
the manner of its use or intended use is
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. The following factors shall be used
in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument,
object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced,
if any; and
(iii) the manner in which the instrument,
object, or thing was used.
In Archambeau,

this

challenge to the term

Court

rejected

a

"dangerous weapon."2

similar

vagueness

In so doing, it

interpreted "dangerous weapon" to include two separate categories
of instruments: "(1) items commonly known as dangerous weapons; and
(2) items not commonly known as dangerous weapons but included if,
in considering the three enunciated [statutory] characteristics,
they qualify."
1991).

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App.

In holding that two 10-inch knives with five- to six-inch

blades and a 48-inch blow gun were commonly known as dangerous
weapons, the Court set out the test that proves dispositive to this
case:

"[0]ur decision must rest on whether defendant should have

been reasonably aware that his hunting knives and blowgun were
objectively dangerous weapons." Id. That is, if the nature of the
item is such that it is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, then that item is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of
the statute.

Id.

2

Contrary to defendant's assertion, Archambeau did not
consider a facial challenge to the statute.
See State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928.
8

The

question

this

Court

must

answer,

then,

is whether

defendant here should have been reasonably aware that his Buck
knife was an objectively dangerous weapon.
specifically

found

that

defendant's

knife

The trial court
was

of

the

type

"ordinarily used for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning,
skinning or dismembering game animals" (R. 39) .

The objectively

intended purpose of the instrument, then, is to cut flesh, muscle,
and bone.
Applying the statutory definition of dangerous weapon, as
construed by the Archambeau court to include the objectively
intended use of the item, the statute plainly warned defendant
that, as a probationer, he could not possess a heavy hunting knife
with a 4^ inch blade. Because the objectively intended use of such
a knife is to cut, clean, skin, and dismember game animals, the
knife is, as a matter of law, capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury and is, therefore, a dangerous weapon.
That the knife had lawful, utilitarian purposes related to
hunting and camping and that defendant may have subjectively
intended to use it for such purposes, as he asserts, is irrelevant
to the determination of whether the knife was an objectively
dangerous weapon within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10501(2) (c).

Indeed, the very usages that defendant cites --

cleaning game, butchering meat, constructing tent pegs, and cutting
rope -- all support the conclusion that the knife was a dangerous
weapon, by inference clearly capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury.

See Br. of Appellant at 18-19.
9

Similarly, defendant's reliance on the size of the knife
("relatively small") is misplaced.

In State v. Rovball, the Utah

Supreme Court recognized that a Buck knife with a four- to six-inch
blade was a deadly weapon within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-501(b) (1978) (defining aggravated assault as assault carried
out with a deadly weapon) . State v. Rovball, 710 P.2d 168, 168-69
(Utah 1985) . If such a knife is "deadly" within the meaning of the
aggravated assault statute, it is a fortiori

"dangerous" within the

meaning of the statute governing possession by a restricted person.
As applied to the facts of defendant's case, the definition of
"dangerous weapon" promulgated by the legislature is as clear as
possible given the variety of items that, in the manner of their
objective use, can cause death or serious bodily injury. See State
v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d at 471. Of course, the legislature could have
tried to enact a precise laundry list of all items that in the
manner of their objectively intended use are capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury.

Even a thorough enumeration,

however, would prudently end with a catch-all provision, e.g., "or
any other item that in the manner of its use or intended use is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."
however,

the statute

provides

a sufficiently

As written,

definite

legal

standard by which defendant and law enforcement officers could
reasonably understand that defendant was prohibited from possessing
the Buck knife at issue.
Finally, defendant reads Archambeau to require that he be
given

specific,

personal

notice
10

of

the prohibition

against

possessing dangerous weapons. This is not a proper reading of the
case.

This Court cited to the actual notice defendant received

only to support

the conclusion

it had already

reached that

Archambeau "should have been reasonably aware" of the objective
dangerousness of the weapons.
929.

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at

Furthermore, everyone is on constructive notice of the laws

of the land.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (1990) ; Worrall v.

Oaden City Fire Dept. , 616 P.2d 598, 603-04 (Utah 1980) (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
"Dangerous weapon," for purposes of the statute at issue,
clearly includes at its core those items that reasonable persons
would not disagree are capable of inflicting death or serious
bodily injury in the manner of their objectively intended use. See
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) ("There can be no
question

that

weapon.");

defendant's

[unloaded]

handgun

is a dangerous

see also State v. Clevidence, 736 P.2d 379 (Ariz. App.

1987) (6" double-bladed hunting knife is deadly weapon, statutorily
defined as "anything designed for lethal use," as a matter of law) .
Defendant's Buck knife is such an item.
Because the statute provides a sufficiently definite standard
against which defendant could determine that his possession of the
Buck

knife

was unlawful, his

argument

that

unconstitutionally vague as applied must fail.

11

the

statute

is

POINT TWO
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
COURT'S

JUDGMENT,

THIS

COURT NEED

NOT REACH HIS SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE CLAIM
In order to mount an insufficiency challenge to a guilty
verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support

of

the trial court's verdict and then demonstrate that "the evidence,
including

all

reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom,

is

insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v.
Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) . If a defendant fails to
properly marshal the evidence, the reviewing court may properly
decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence claim.

State

v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) cert, denied, 857
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah
App. 1991); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-89 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, because defendant has wholly failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's verdict, this Court should
not consider his claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person.

12

ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not request oral argument in this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O^day of February, 1995,
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

%m^L C jMkJc
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to Michael J. Petro, Attorney for Defendant, Young and
Kester, 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah

84663, this 10 day

of February, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A
T r i a l C o u r t ' s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Verdict

t'-*Z7

I 53 hi VI

JN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

^

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
and VERDICT
CASE NO. 941400119
DATE May 27, 1994

RANDALL PUGMIRE
Defendant.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
CLERK: LHH

This matter came before the Court for trial on May 23, 1994. Deputy Utah County
Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was
present and represented by Mike Petro, Esq.
The defendant, in open court, waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench
trial. The plaintiff did not object.
The court accepted a stipulation of the parties regarding the testimony of witness Ron
Carlson, who was then excused.
The following witnesses were called by the plaintiff and sworn and testified, to-wit:
Jerry Knight, Rexine Esplin and Officer Weinmuller. The court received exhibit 1. The
plaintiff rested after which, the defendant moved the court to dismiss count 1: Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs. The plaintiff responded to the motion. The court granted
the motion and dismissed count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a Third

Degree Felony. Mr. Petro was directed to prepare findings and conclusions consistent with
the court's granting of the motion to dismiss.
Regarding count 2: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor the
defendant admitted his guilt, and the court made a finding that the defendant was guilty of
Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor.
Regarding count 4 of the Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, the defendant advised the court that he would not
put on any testimony and admitted to the court that on or about February 8, 1994, in Utah
County, Utah, the defendant was on probation for a felony and had in his possession at that
time a knife. The defendant handed to the court a prepared Trial Memorandum Argument
and asked that the court receive the Trial Memorandum Argument with regard to count 4 of
the Information. The plaintiff requested a short time in which to respond and the court
received the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the
Information on May 26, 1994. The court being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following findings, conclusions and renders a verdict:
1.

UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows: "Any person who is on parole for a felony

or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any item that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In construing
2

whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used
are determinative."
2.

The appellate courts of this state have not directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket

knife, nor what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute a dangerous weapon.
Counsel for the defendant has furnished the court with citations to cases in California,
Hawaii, Oregon and Nevada which have considered what constitutes an ordinary pocket knife
and what type of a knife would be considered a dangerous weapon or a dagger or a dirk for
purposes of the particular state's statute. The cases cited by defense counsel are somewhat
enlightening but not particularly helpful with regard to the Utah statute.
3.

A personal examination of the knife found on the defendant at the time of his arrest has

been made by the court. The parties agreed that the court could view the knife and the court
has taken the liberty of marking the knife as exhibit #6. The knife itself, in this court's
view, is not what one would consider an ordinary pocket knife. The knife is very large and
very heavy to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife that would ordinarily be carried in a
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110. It consists of a large and mostly metal handle
being four and seven-eighths inches in length and ranges in width from one and one-eighth
inches on one end of the handle to seven-eighths inches on the blade end of the handle. The
actual blade of the knife is a large heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches wide at its
3

widest point tapering to a point on the end of the blade. The blade is well sharpened and the
total length of the blade is four and one-half inches and the blade extending from the knife
when opened is three and three-quarters inches to four inches, depending on the measurement
from the rounded handle to the tip of the blade. This court is of the opinion that this is the
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning,
skinning or dismembering game animals. The blade of the knife is in a locked position when
fully opened.
4.

The court concludes that this knife is not an ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use

of the knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and is a dangerous weapon
under the provisions of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a).
5.

The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the

Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree
Felony.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 27th day of May, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

BOYD L. PARK, J U D G E /
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Utah County Attorney
Mike Petro, Esq.
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